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1Analytical Framework
Supplier Systems in Late-Industrializing Economies
This chapter discusses the framework for analyzing supplier systems, with a special
emphasis on conditions in late-industrializing or developing economies. From the
perspective of mechanisms of risk management and capability upgrading promotion,
supplier systems can be roughly divided into two types: united-type and isolated-type
systems. A model is presented here for determining which type applies in a particular
case, using various conditions involving the competitive environment and the capabil-
ity of firms. I will then present the assumption that, in today’s developing economies
and particularly in China, the supplier system is more likely to be inclined toward an
isolated type.
I. Objectives and Mechanisms within the System: Risk Management
and Promotion of Capability Upgrading
According to agency theory, a supplier system is an institution made up of many
incentive mechanisms set up by the principal to get its agents to achieve various
objectives. Assuming that the maker is the principal and that the suppliers are its
agents, the maker tries to accomplish diverse objectives, including ensuring the qual-
ity, cost, and delivery (QCD) of suppliers; promoting their rationalization; and strength-
ening cooperation on product development. At the same time, suppliers, through the
same system, pursue objectives such as securing payments from the maker, ensuring
stability in orders, and upgrading their own manufacturing and development capabili-
ties. Methods for achieving those objectives are also diverse and a variety of mecha-
nisms can be included concurrently in a single system.1
This study focuses on two of these mechanisms: risk management and the promo-
tion of capability upgrading.
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Risk management involves measures, both prior and ex post facto, used by both
makers and suppliers to minimize risks. I take particular notice of the methods used to
minimize the risks to the overall system through cooperation between the parties
rather than having each side work to reduce its own risks. Risk reduction for each
agent is considered to lead to an increase of profits.2 For each side, the promotion of
capability upgrading means supporting or encouraging the upgrading of the transac-
tion partner’s capability in order to increase its own profits (or those of the system as
a whole). This study looks primarily at the promotion of capability upgrading directed
by the maker toward its suppliers.
1. Risk Management
The primary risks assumed here are: (1) the risk that a partner will fail to fulfill the
contract (contract risk), and (2) the risk that the final product will not be valued in the
market and therefore will fail to sell (market risk).
Risk (1), from the perspective of the maker, includes such events as the discovery of
technological defectives among the products provided by the suppliers and the failure
of delivery as contracted, while the risks from the perspective of suppliers include, for
example, the refusal of the maker to purchase the parts they have developed or to
make payment as contracted.
Makers, in particular, exercise ingenuity to minimize “supplier failure.” The ex ante
arrangements include setting parameters such as quality standards, management stan-
dards, operation standards as well as parameter enforcement via monitoring through
inspections, the provision of incentives, and penalties (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001,
p. 20).
As for risk (2), the failure of a new product leads to the loss of the investment into
development. Such failures can be caused by a variety of reasons including economic
downturns, changes of consumer preference, competition with rivals, and wrong
projections of market needs (marketing failure). Generally speaking, the greater the
uniqueness of the product compared with existing products prevailing (valued) in the
market, the greater the risk.
Risk (2) is affected by risk (1). If a supplier has a quality problem, the market
valuation of the final product may decrease. Delays in the delivery of parts can cause
a delay across the board in launching the new product and thus to a failure to sell at the
appropriate time. Thus, a reduction in risk (1) can lead to a reduction of risk (2).
Suppliers are far from immune to risk (2). If the relationship between them is one that
focuses on mid- to long-term profits, unfavorable sales on the part of the maker will
have an impact on their transactions in the coming periods. Considering the connec-
tions described above, risks (1) and (2) both confront the system at large.
The maker is in the leading position not only for coordinating interfirm ex ante
arrangements to minimize the risk of the system, but also to determine ex post
arrangements such as the distribution of risk among the maker and suppliers. The
arrangements for risk distribution vary from full absorption by the maker (providing
perfect insurance) to risk sharing between the maker and suppliers (partial insurance)
and to the full shifting of risk by the maker to its suppliers.
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2. Promotion of Capability Upgrading
The promotion of capability upgrading is mainly discussed in the context of makers
providing such promotion to suppliers. Upgrading suppliers’ capability is a very
important ex ante arrangement used to reduce risks. In order to reduce risk (1), a
variety of know-how, technologies, and skills are needed in order to promote quality
control and cost reductions. These can be provided directly by makers to suppliers or
indirectly, by encouraging suppliers to learn them. Furthermore, as makers develop
products that rely upon the expertise held by suppliers, upgrading the engineering
capability of suppliers leads directly to the reduction of risk (2). Intentional efforts by
buyers to improve supplier capability and performance are called “supplier develop-
ment” (Leenders 1965, Krause 1997).
Supplier development is generally divided into direct transaction-specific arrange-
ments and infrastructural arrangements that enhance the effects of the former. The
former includes target setting for suppliers, support for human resource development,
and the provision of technological guidance, investment, and personnel interchanges,
while the latter includes the sharing of strategic objectives, increased communication,
continuous commitment, trust building, and so on (Humphreys, Li, and Chan 2004,
pp. 132–34). In China we frequently observe a unilateral and simple method under
which makers force two or more suppliers to compete against each other on the same
playing field.
In this study, transaction-specific arrangements are called “nurturing,” while broader
arrangements combining them with infrastructural arrangements as well as the burden
of unilateral competition pressure are termed “promotion of capability upgrading.”
II. Selection and Change of the System: Isolated Type vs. United Type
In considering risk management and the promotion of capability upgrading, the
supplier system can be roughly divided into the isolated type and united type. The
type of system is determined by the competitive environment surrounding firms and
by the quality and level of the capabilities both of their own firm and their transaction
partners. The mechanism of the selection and change of the system can be described
as follows:
When a maker plans a transaction system with suppliers, the following options are
available: The maker, by absorbing the risks of suppliers and exerting nurturing
efforts (i.e., by paying the costs for providing insurance and nurturing, C) draws a
commitment (Cm) from suppliers to strategically upgrade their capabilities. Commit-
ment in this context means the will to upgrade their own capability from the status quo
in order to meet the partner’s expectations, along with efforts made to this end. Let us
assume that this generates a “relational quasi-rent” (hereafter called “rent,” denoted
by R)3 between the maker and its suppliers. In cases where the capabilities of the
maker and the suppliers are highly complementary, enhanced capability among sup-
pliers will strengthen the position of the maker in development, production, and sales,
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in that a stable supply can be secured, quality can be upgraded, development speed
can be accelerated, and new technologies of suppliers can be utilized. This is the main
source of R.
However, the maker does not pay the cost C in every case of supplier development.
Especially in developing countries, such investment is not likely to be undertaken, for
various environmental and capability-related reasons.
In the case where C of the current term is greater than R to be generated in the next
term, meaning that (R − C (the net profit) < 0, which is the case of R++ in Environment
(2) in Figure 1-1), the maker, rather than bearing such a cost, will conduct a spot-
market-type transaction. In the case of (R − C) > 0 (the case of R+ in Environment (1)
in Figure 1-1), the maker will bear the cost to the point where net profit is maximized
(C* in Figure 1-1). If C* exceeds CI, the cost of fully purchasing the supplier, the
maker will integrate it into its firm. When C is very small and approaches zero, I call
the supplier system an isolated-type system. When the level of C is large, I call it a
united-type system.4
The amount of R derived from the maker’s C differs depending upon the competi-
tive environment surrounding firms and the capabilities of both the maker and suppli-
ers. I will discuss this by dividing it into the effect through which the maker’s C draws
forth suppliers’ Cm (effect of commitment acquisition) and the effect through which
Cm generates R (effect of rent acquisition) [R = R (Cm (C))].
1. Effect of Commitment Acquisition
From the viewpoint of suppliers, the effect of commitment acquisition is affected
chiefly by “profitability,” “credibility of transactions,” and the “substitutability of
transaction partners.” If the expected return to be brought about by the transaction is
low (e.g., market risks are high due to rapid changes in technologies and demand, and
C: Cost that makers invest (to develop suppliers’ capability or
to provide insurance)
Notes: 1. C is the investment that makers make to develop suppliers using the profit of the primary
period. C will bring about a rent and net profits to makers in the second period. Inflation
and interest rates are assumed to be zero. Decreasing marginal returns are assumed
2. C* = Maximized point of net profits (R − C),
CI = Procuring cost of the supplier (integration cost).
Fig. 1-1. Selection of United- and Isolated-Type Systems
R+(C): Environment (1)
→ Makers invest until level C* to develop suppliers’ capability.
(“United system” is selected.)
R++(C): Environment (2)
→ Makers’ investment is restricted to very low or zero level.
(“Isolated system” is selected.)
R: Rent R = C
C* CI
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there are other transactions from which higher returns can be expected), and transac-
tion rules are yet to be established in the industry (e.g., a judicial system is not in place
to enforce contract fulfillment, or the industry is riddled with opportunism and trans-
action partners are not sufficiently trustworthy), the level of Cm acquired by investing
a given level of C will be low. This point is important in developing economies, where
official and unofficial institutions for ensuring contracts in modern market transac-
tions are generally immature. In contrast, in a market where the expected return is
high and disciplined transaction rules are in place, the level of Cm acquired by a given
level of C is high, and thus the merit of cooperative action will be greater.
2. Effect of Rent Acquisition
The effect of rent acquisition is determined by the “exploitation effect of capabil-
ity” of both the maker and suppliers and the “type of product technology” demanded
by the market.
(1) Exploitation Effect of Capability
The exploitation effect of capability has the following two meanings: Firstly, it
indicates the “possibility of capability upgrading” of suppliers in response to encour-
agement by the maker. When a supplier’s potential is low and the speed of capability
upgrading is slow, the level of R to be acquired should also be low. The result is the
same when the maker’s leadership is weak and there are very limited measures
available to upgrade supplier capability.
Secondly, it represents the “possibility of exploitation by rivals” of the supplier’s
capability. If the supplier, making use of the capability enhanced by the maker’s
nurturing efforts, provides a rival maker with improved parts, the rival’s market
position might be enhanced, which in turn might lead to a decrease in the maker’s R.
And yet, nurturing efforts are in fact exerted, possibly for the following reasons:
If the “degree of transaction specificity” of the supplier’s capability to the maker is
high,5 the possibility of its being exploited by rivals is low. At the same time, there are
few suppliers equipped with such capability, and therefore, makers will actively
nurture them. However, this situation is not common.
In fact, makers frequently nurture basic and general-purpose capabilities that are
likely to exert merits for any transaction partner.6 They do so (1) when the maker can
restrict the transaction scope of suppliers by other measures, and (2) when the
capability’s complementarity7 to the maker is greater than to other makers, or in other
words, when the exploitation of the supplier’s capability by rivals cannot become a
source of competitive advantage for the rivals as it is with the maker.
An example of case (1) is when the supplier’s scope of transaction can be restricted
by capital affiliation, or the supplier is so small in scale that it cannot afford to develop
transaction partners other than the maker.
The following is a possible example of case (2). Maker A, whose source of product
differentiation is the capability to achieve good product planning and high quality, can
differentiate itself from its competitors by excellence in product concept and the
quality of the most important parts α, which are manufactured in-house, whereas the
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product cannot be perfected unless the quality of externally made complementary
parts β (to be purchased from supplier B) is secured. And if the rival maker, even if it
purchases parts β from the same supplier B, is unable to make as good a final product
as that made by A, A will nurture B. It is presumably on the basis of this assumption
that in developing economies, foreign makers nurture indigenous suppliers in terms
of basic general-purpose capabilities, such as quality management.
The implications of (2) with regard to the industrial development of late-industrial-
izing economies are significant. The great majority of makers in late-industrializing
economies are homogeneous, in that they commonly have few internal technologi-
cally and managerially original resources8 that can be sources of long-lasting com-
petitive advantage, and they are heavily dependent upon the quality and originality of
external resources (e.g., purchased parts) to offset this weakness. In this case, impor-
tant parts are not made internally, but are predominantly purchased from outside. In
this situation, the source of decisive competitive advantage can easily be exploited by
rival makers, and investment into qualitative improvements of suppliers is unlikely to
be made since it might benefit rivals. The more the rival firms are homogeneous in
terms of technological capability, the more unlikely it is that nurturing efforts will
take place.
The problem of technological capability building, where many firms in late-indus-
trializing economies, especially in China, are likely to share a homogeneous techno-
logical capability, will be discussed in Chapter 3.
(2) Types of Product Technology
In the case where the market demands a high level of “product quality,” it can be
presumed that stronger mutual coordination and continuous knowledge sharing must
take place between the maker and suppliers. Examples are cases where, to achieve
optimum quality, a greater level of careful coordination between parts is required at
the design phase, and a high level of quality control is demanded in the production
phase. The same is true in the case when new products or processes with high novelty
are developed jointly with suppliers. In contrast, when there is no demand for high
quality, “so-so” products that can be made with a lower level of mutual cooperation
are likely to satisfy the demand. The same is true in the case of minor-change type
development, with a low level of novelty (Chapter 3).
A different level of mutual coordination is also required in accordance with the
difference in product “architecture.” For instance, in transactions involving functional
parts for personal computers and bicycles, which are developed and produced based
on a highly “modularized” design, the R acquired from a given level of Cm should be
small,9 whereas in transactions involving parts for automobiles and motorcycles,
which require complex mutual coordination among parts at the design phase (called
“integral”), it should generate a higher level of R. However, this aspect will have no
significant influence upon the discussions in the subsequent chapters of this study,
since the motorcycles that will be analyzed are all developed and produced in accor-
dance with a common design between Japan and in China, and they are, in other
words, products of the same architecture.
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III. Advantages of the Respective Systems and Impact upon Capability
Accumulation
Each of the systems has its own merits and demerits. The united system, as described
above, has an advantage in terms of offering high quality and novelty. This advantage
will presumably increase as the system continues. This is because the accumulation
and sharing of knowledge concerning goods that are mutually complementary within
the system further contributes to its advantage in product development and quality
improvement. In this respect, this system is effective in industries or development
phases where “incremental technological innovation” (Chapter 3) plays an important
role.
On the other hand, this system cannot respond easily to rapid changes of technolo-
gies and business models. The maker has to distribute risks within the system and
sometimes to take risks upon itself, and rapid environmental changes can increase
risks beyond the level the maker can assume. If excessive risks have to be assumed in
order to maintain the system, it can lead to a weakening of its own management.
At the same time, any strategic failure by the maker strongly affects suppliers.
Furthermore, the suppliers, while upgrading their technologies as required by the
maker, may lose an opportunity to broaden and enhance their skills in other spheres.
The strength of the isolated-type system is its flexibility in responding to techno-
logical and environmental changes. Responses to such changes are easier in the sense
that the utilization of external resources is free from the “constraints” of the existing
business partners. In addition, both the maker and suppliers can more easily circum-
vent the risk of their partner’s failures. Under this system, new firms that cannot afford
to assume risks can enter the market with relative ease.
The technological demerit of this system is that it makes it difficult for firms to
share knowledge about complementary goods, which may make it difficult for the
maker to develop and produce high-quality products and new technologies. Suppliers
move independently toward expanding their scope of technologies, and the maker,
who does not have an adequate knowledge of these moves, is unable to evaluate them
and thus does not find it easy to integrate the achievements of the suppliers.
What is most important here is the fact that the continuation of the isolated-type
system makes it difficult for firms to accumulate complementary knowledge about the
overall system of the industry’s technology. This, in the longer run, is likely to
decelerate the technological upgrading of the overall system.
IV. Summary
Table 1-1 shows a summary of the above discussion. It must be stressed that the
framework of this chapter has been formulated to explain the current status of the
present developing economies (China, in particular). Needless to say, each country,
each industry, and each targeted market segment has mixed conditions that may lead
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them to become isolated- or united-type systems. However, viewed holistically, in
developing economies, the conditions leading to an isolated-type system exist to a
greater extent. An economy or industry wishing to achieve a united-type system must
overcome such conditions, requiring that the government exercise enforcement and/
or provide incentives.
Especially in China, which is undergoing a transition to a market economy and at
the same time, in some aspects, remains an underdeveloped country, and which also
has a huge population, making it possible for vast numbers of firms to enter the
competition (since a single or a few firms are unlikely to occupy the whole domestic
demand), the following can be anticipated. Due to the immaturity of institutions that
TABLE 1-1
FACTORS AND CONDITIONS THAT DETERMINE THE TYPE OF SUPPLIER SYSTEM
Conditions Leading to Conditions Leading to
a United System an Isolated System
A. Factors Affecting the Effect of Commitment Acquisition
Profitability per unit High Low
Credibility of transactions Well-formed market transaction Disorder of market transactions,
order (matured market mecha- rampant opportunism
nism)
Substitutability of Limited number of transaction Many, homogeneous transaction
transaction partners partners with differentiable partners
capabilities
B. Factors Affecting the Effect of Rent Acquisition
a. Exploitation effect of capability
Possibility of capability Strong leadership of makers Weak leadership of makers
upgrading (wide knowledge on overall (narrow knowledge on
product technology, rich products, especially on suppliers’
financial resources, etc.), parts, shallow financial
suppliers with great resources), low development
development potential potential of suppliers
Possibility of exploitation Maker has specific competitive Maker does not have specific
by rivals advantages (stronger comple- competitive advantages and
mentarity with suppliers). relies heavily on external
Maker has measures for resources (weaker comple-
restricting suppliers’ transactions mentarity with suppliers).
(via equity participation). No measures to control
suppliers.
b. Types of product technology
Quality of product Demand for high quality and Demand is satisfied with low
demand novelty quality and low novelty, demand
for standardized products.
Architecture Integral Modular
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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can encourage and ensure fair market transactions compared to those in the developed
economies, there is great room for opportunism. At least until the beginning of the
first decade of the twenty-first century, in spite of extremely active new entries, few
publicly owned corporations withdrew from the market. As demand is predominantly
from low-income sectors, the qualitative requirements for products are relatively low.
These factors are likely to lower the effects of commitment and rent acquisition,
leading to an isolated-type system (the above-mentioned conditions are chiefly dis-
cussed in the next chapter).
Furthermore, the following can be predicted with regard to the technological capa-
bilities of firms. Due to the long history of industrialization, firms have basic manu-
facturing technologies, but most products were newly launched in the 1980s and
1990s, and therefore, both makers and suppliers have only a narrow knowledge of
overall product technologies. In particular, the technological leadership of makers
over suppliers is weak. Since there is a large number of internal homogeneous makers
and suppliers, the complementarity of capabilities among firms is weak and the
substitutability of transaction partners is high, and so is the likelihood of rivals
exploiting investment into nurturing. These conditions will tend to lead to an isolated-
type system (the above conditions are discussed primarily in Chapter 3).
As such, the study essentially assumes that in China today, with its lack of govern-
ment intervention and an immature market transaction system, the transaction system
is likely to move toward an isolated type.
Chapters 4 to 6 will empirically discuss whether these conditions actually led the
supplier system in China to become an isolated type, and how the system changed
along with conditions, analyzing the cases of the motorcycle industry from the 1980s
to 2004.
Notes
1 For contradictions and trade-offs among objectives and the complementarity of various
mechanisms, see Itoh and McMillan (1998).
2 It is Knight (1985) who attributed the source of the profit of a firm to its specific organiza-
tional capability to reduce risk (uncertainty in his terminology).
3 A quasi-rent is the added benefit that can be obtained by continuing the transaction with the
current partner rather than switching to another partner, and it is different from rent,
meaning benefits that increases when the party enters into a new transaction. The former is
a proper concept for considering the decisions of longer-term continuous business relation-
ships (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, pp. 269–72). Aoki, clarifying the concept of relational
quasi-rent through concrete examples in Japan, argues that it is generated by improved
information communication (1988, p. 218). Asanuma argues that it is generated as supplier’s
“relational skill” is accumulated to meet the maker’s demand (1989, p. 25). This chapter
follows Asanuma’s perspective. For the simplicity of terminology, the relational quasi-rent
is referred to as rent in the following parts of this book.
4 As shown in the followings chapters, Japanese system, especially as adopted by Honda, is
an extreme form of a united system, or “quasi-integrated system,” where the level of C is
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very close to CI; the maker’s leadership is overwhelming, and suppliers are generally
subordinate.
5 A representative example of this is the capability that suppliers were required to achieve to
respond to Toyota Motor Company’s “just-in-time system,” when it was not yet a common
practice.
6 Asanuma (1989), stating that the relational skills “always consists of two layers: the surface
layer which corresponds to accumulated learning acquired through transactions with a
given core firm, on the one hand, and the basic layer which corresponds to general techno-
logical capabilities, on the other” (p. 21), emphasizes incentives for suppliers to acquire
general and basic skills.
7 It is Richardson (1972) that made it clear that the degree of complementarity of capabilities
between firms determines the mode of coordination of their activities.
8 Such resources are thought to be mainly intangible “knowledge-based assets” that cannot
be easily transferred, and can only be obtained through deliberate efforts to access and
accumulate them through long-term experiences. See Nelson and Winter (1982), Demsetz
(1988), and Amsden (2001).
9 “Modularization” means technological ingenuity that aims to curtail the mutual coordina-
tion among materials (and among the firms that produce them) that is invariably needed for
industrial products that are assembled from a large number of materials. Suggested by
Yoshimi It$o. For details of modularity, see Baldwin and Clark (1997).
